I sometimes think of a “self” as a conceptual collage. Like a pieced quilt ideas grow into each other, the edges seamed to make something that works as a whole. For someone like me, many of those “pieces” come from books.

I’m not going to list those but I’ve just added another.

I’ve been reading (on and off) Chance & Necessity by Jacques Monod. It was suggested to me by a reader here (Thanks!) and trusting her assessment I added it to my rather full current reading list.

I love science, and in particular chemistry and biology, so a book such as Monod’s was pretty much destined to be a good one for me. But this book!

I suppose what is so compelling for me about the book is not really the appeal to choice, or chance (as an explanation for our existence) or even reason, but rather the ideas that connect the shape of complex molecules and information. It’s that concordance of material expression and information; it feels like a rhizome growing at a high rate of speed down in the dark of my mind.

Here’s another oddity: for some reason this connects with Bachelard’s book on domestic space. Why that should be so I don’t yet know, at least not consciously. Apart from the two authors’ cultural commonalities, there seems little reason to connect them, but they are contiguous pieces in this developing “quilt” of mine. I know that somehow.

The idea that the nature of noncovalent chemical bonds and their energy potential underlies more gross forms as well as macromolecular structure itself as information–it tumbles my mind around with the implications.

In a section talking about the apparent contradiction between the idea of the genome “entirely defining” the function of a protein, and the idea that the expressed shape of a manifested protein has “surplus” information – this is it I think, the thing that messes with my mind.

He explains this apparent contradiction through chance in the form of environmental conditions.

A careful and detailed scrutiny of the mechanisms of molecular epigenesis disposes of this objection. The enrichment of information evidenced in the forming of three-dimensional protein structures comes from the fact that genetic information (represented by the sequence) is expressed under strictly defined initial conditions (aqueous phase, narrow latitude of temperatures, ionic composition, etc.). The result is that of all the structures possible only one is actually realized. Initial conditions hence enter among the items of information finally enclosed within the globular structure. Without specifying it, they contribute to the realization of a unique shape by elimitating all alernative stuructures, in this way proposing – or rather, imposing – an unequivocal interpretation of  potentially equivocal message.

The implications!

I popped over to the web and looked up a few reactions to Monod’s book. Of the  ones I saw, the majority were from religious fellows and Oh! they did not like the book. Not surprised. Essentially, should the biology/chemistry be correct, (Monod was a Nobel Laureate) macromolecular materially encoded information is the necessary engine by which matter comes to express sentience. Oh so very cool.

It does have a downside though. It makes me want to go back to school to take more degrees, but this time in science. And I just don’t have the requisite number of years it would take me to catch up on all the stuff I don’t know.

Meh.

I came across this idea — “doctrine of signatures”. I don’t remember ever hearing about it before, despite the fact that I am quite familiar with plant gathering, wild food and wild medicines.

What the “doctrine of signatures” says: “herbs that resemble various parts of the body can be used to treat ailments of that part of the body.”

Of course it’s ridiculous. In fact, it’s right up there with Comfort’s banana idea. Apart from the wondrous silliness of the idea, they both have at least two other things in common. Both arguments rely on 1) the existence of a Divine being that shapes each detail of the universe and 2)  that being shapes things with man as center of its concern.

There are two things that interest me in ideas like this. The first is the odd mental “logic” of people who speak about Mother Nature as a being with rights equal to, or in excess of human rights, and then stick with a philosophical system that plops humankind down as the center of the universe. Doesn’t that seem, to anyone, a bit of a contradiction?

The second, and most interesting, thing about this doctrine, is what it actually seems to indicate. The fact that most human cultures have something similar – learning to recognize plants by referring plant shapes to some well known (usually human) attribute – indicates an application of body attribute to memory and to social knowledge.

I think it a bit like reading shapes into clouds. One can do that and others can recognize it once the shape is pointed out. Constellations are the same. As are the dark and light regions of the moon. As far as I know all cultures read clouds, stars, and the moon as meaningful – and Lo! such readings miraculously fit the local stories, traditions, ideas about reality.

The real question seems to me to be why read the information back to the plant (star, moon, etc) and claim that the connection to our lives rests in the external world instead of in ourselves? I’m going to think about that for a bit.

Any ideas?

April 8th, 2012

philosophical question

Asking why we live in a universe of something rather than nothing may be no more meaningful than asking why some flowers are red and others blue.

Heh.

Fun article.

I was reading an article from 1917 that appeared in The Journal of Heredity. I got to the end of the pdf and was met with the title of the next item: “Miscegenation in Hawaii.” Oooooh.

After that there is “Eugenics as the Basis of Sociology”.

So two text bits for you:

“Dr. Frederick L. Hoffman, who publishes these figures in a pamphlet on The Sanitary Progress and Vital Statistics of Hawaii, says all observations show that the intermixture of native women with full-blood Chinese has produced a physically and morally superior type.”

Nice of him to so assess.

Then ..

“As an introduction to the study of sociology, Prof. Kelsey has complied what is practically a text-book of eugenics. He has usually followed good authorities and (excepting the weak chapter on racial differences) his biology is on the whole sound. One wishes that Prof. Kelsey had used his sociological knowledge to make an original contribution to the applied eugenics: perhaps he will do so in a future volume.”

Note on Kelsey: He wrote a book called The Negro Farmer apparently without actually going into any Negro person’s house, although he did spend time in the south while he researched what was originally his PhD dissertation. The book in question above is The Physical Basis of Society. The racial differences chapter is a hoot.

For example:

  • “The Amerindian peoples are mainly descended from an early branch of Mongolic mixed with Proto-Caucasian”
  • “The proud peoples of Western and Southern Europe and of North Africa, of Syria, Arabia and Persia, are principally composed of Caucasian tinged very slightly or considerably with ancient or modern Negro, or Australoid (Dravidian) blood”
  • “the war-like tribes of Northeast Africa are half Caucasian, half Negro.”
  • “The very Negro himself is scarcely of unmixed subspecific rank, except in his extreme Bushman-Hottentot, Pigmy and West-African Forest types.”

 

Imagine for a moment that you are a black person and this guy’s student. R. R. Wright Jr was in 1905 and 1906.

Ouch.

I found a book called Onto-Ethologies: The Animal Environments of Uexküll, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Deleuze by Brett Buchanan. I mean, oooooooooh. So right up my alley.  For those of you that want to read Uexküll, you can find Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans: With a Theory of Meaning as a digital book. I’ve got a copy through one of my local universities so I can’t post a link (since you’d need a library login to get to it).

For this post I just want to speak a bit about Jakob von Uexküll and some of his weird-assed ideas.

To begin, please remember that Jakob was born in 1864, Darwin’s Origin was published in 1859 and the core of classical genetics wasn’t in place until 1915.

Weird-assed idea number 1: natural selection is inadequate to explain “the orientation of present features and behaviours toward future ends–purposefulness.” (Dorion Sagan, from Unwelt After Uexküll (introduction, page 3).

Weird-assed idea number 2: “nonhuman perceptions must be accounted for in any biology worthy of the name” (same set of Sagan passages)

Weird-assed idea number 3: Meaning has priority in all living beings.

Weird-assed idea number 4: There’s a master plan somewhere outside of individual form that guides “purpose.”

Weird-assed idea number 5: All living beings are subjects, and not mere objects.

Weird-assed idea number 6: “When a dog runs, the animal moves its feet, i.e., the harmony of the footsteps is centrally controlled. But in the case of a starfish we say: ‘When a starfish moves, the legs move the animal.’ That is, the harmony of the movement is in the legs themselves. It is like an orchestra that can play without a conductor.” The starfish’s legs take the starfish along, whereas you decide where you want your feet to go.” (Dorion Sagan again)

There are other weird ideas but that’s enough to go on with.

Pick them apart. To say “meaning has priority in all living beings” implies that context and environment takes priority because meaning is only found in the relationship between one form and another. That’s actually quite a radical suggestion even today, but to understand what the author was really doing one has to understand, or at least be familiar with, the fight over the concept of life form as subject or object, the fight over the concept of bio-mechanism.

Animals are mere machines: If you could go back in time would you kill Descartes?

I get the concern to pull back from any idea that the non-human living world is mechanistic in the same way my blender is mechanistic but a basic grounding in science today should have already blown that idea apart. But remember Jakob isn’t today’s scientist. He’s still immersed in the idea of vitalism.

Here’s how Jakob shows that particular fight: “We ask a simple question: Is the tick a machine or a machine operator? Is it a mere object or a subject?”

And there you go: down the rabbit hole of assumed shit.

In today’s parlance the machine and the operator are one.  To separate them is to miss the point of the wonders of complex chemical signalling and information processing that occur in the inanimate world, and of which the animate (living) world make use.

So here’s the thing…can we still make use of the weird-assed ideas given vitalism’s influence in Jakob’s work?

Oh yes, I think so. In fact it’s a good thing to do so because we get more practice in pulling apart insight and interpretation. The idea that purpose is a hall-mark of life forms is an insight. Attributing that fact to some “master-plan” is interpretation.

Once purpose is divorced from teleology one can generate new interpretations based on the wealth of fact we’ve gained in recent decades.

And then in a few more decades we’ll do the same with today’s interpretations.

And so science, and thinking, proceed.

I’ve been trying to read Poetry and the Fate of the Senses by Susan Stewart and frankly I’m having trouble getting past the introductory chapters which, amongst other things, lay out the assumptions that are likely to underpin all further argument.

Here’s the fundamental question it makes me ask: What does “meaning” actually mean?

And yes I get that it is somewhat of a meaningless question – a tautology, as it were. But you see that’s, what the book feels like.

For this post, let me back up for a minute and give you a very basic image that I use to imagine abstraction and how it works. It is my hope that the image will make explaining my problem with this book’s set-up more obvious.

Image a black screen. On the screen near the lower center is a white globe. That white globe is the human body and all its doings, including the apprehension of the world, its assessment and consequent behavioural modification – those things we normally call a mind. Now imagine that the black screen is full of energy packets zooming around. Each of those packets has a very specific shape – triangles, cubes, rhomboids, etc. The white ball has a number of openings that conform to some of the shapes but not to others.

Here is the first layer of meaning. The shapes of energy packets in the black screen beyond the white ball that are not matched by the shapes in the white ball are meaningless. They are invisible, untouchable, silent, tasteless, etc. This layer of meaning is shared by all forms that endure for any length. Complex chemicals “recognize” some other chemicals and not others. Those ones are meaningful to the complex chemical because it can recognize them. This is not self awareness, but it is recognition.

In human beings this layer of meaning is ever present. In this sense there is no moment in the life of a human being in which the universe is meaningless since there is never a time when the basic chemical and sensual recognitions and processes are not ongoing. This has a good deal of impact on Stewart’s fundamental image of darkness and night as formless, with no boundary and therefore not allowing any intersubjectivity or an ongoing dialectic.

Second image: Along with the white sphere there is now a smaller blue sphere. The two spheres are connected; the blue sphere is dependent upon the white one. At the level of mind that starts to create self-aware abstractions (that is meaningful recognitions that endure long enough for those recognitions to be called aware, and be manipulable by the imagination), mini “worlds” are created. A mentally constituted mini world is a blue sphere. The first order meanings that are always ongoing go through a further process if they are neurologically active enough (firing time crosses a time threshold). This later process is founded on the earlier processes but are projected onto a screen of their own – and a mini world is created to rotate, grasp, assess, manipulate the few “recognitions” that are part of the being’s current concern.

What the body does is posit a smaller “body”, limiting the “variables” so that a specific concern can be addressed in a simplified, but still recognizable “field”. This is an abstraction and the blue sphere.

The thing is that once inside the world of the blue sphere the same process can be accomplished and a new tertiary set of spheres be postulated and manipulated. By their nature, these imitation “bodies” – which are abstractions and simplifications – feel like a total world in themselves. But these small blue worlds cannot function as whole worlds, anymore than a virgin can know what sex is like by reading the Kama Sutra. The risk is that the blue sphere “forgets” its connection (and dependency) on the the white sphere. This is when abstractions take on a life of their own and often get completely outside the bounds of reality – and, often, polite society. (Think about the abstraction – women are the source of trouble in men’s lives – when you create a world out of that, you can easily forget that women are also the source of new men (baby boys), the source of much pleasure, and posit a world in which women don’t need to exist – e.g. monasticism. Look at the trouble that has got the Catholic Church into.)

Here is a real world example: Ask yourself the question, How can I live a meaningful life? An abstract-generating question. You might think about ethics, or pleasure, or narrative, or a number of other areas in human life, but in an attempt to answer such a question you are unlikely to include questions like what shall I cook for dinner tonight  or  I wonder who’s scratching at the door. These last two are concerns of the white sphere, but not of this particular blue sphere generated by my question.

But imagine now that you get caught up in this particular blue sphere and your connection is something deep and profound. Then your tummy rumbles. The concern for supper becomes not a concern temporarily set aside, but an intrusion, even a threat to the integrity of the small blue “world”. If you cannot “remember” that the abstract blue world you created to deal with this question of meaning is just an abstracted small portion of the larger real world (the white sphere), then any “foreign” thoughts threaten the new world. In that moment, the unknown presenting itself becomes an act of war.

So back to Stewart: Her abstract world – her blue sphere – is language devoid of bodily sources of meaning.

But I disagree. Night is not formless. The unconscious is merely unaware, not empty. Language is not “a counter to the oblivion of darkness”. I doubt whether language (or poetry) counters anything at all – that is, it isn’t in a combative relationship with the body from which it originates. What combat is created, what need to counter the unseen, comes from this abstraction taking its role as a “world” literally and forgetting to dissolve in the face of the larger needs of the originating body.

 

December 21st, 2011

thinking in school

A friend sent me an article called Making Philosophy Matter—or Else by Lee McIntyre.  It is a complaint that philosophy as taught in universities is becoming obsolete. McIntyre wants it to have, instead, a lasting impact on students – to matter.

A good way to start might be to share with our students why we ourselves care so much about philosophy—how it has helped us in our own lives, as citizens or even personally. But how many of us actually do that? We extol Socrates, but how many dare to follow his example? Of course some philosophers are out there making philosophy matter, and we should talk more about them to our students: how Martha Nussbaum’s political philosophy has influenced her work with the poor in India; how Peter Singer’s theoretical ethics has informed his advocacy for animal rights; how Kristin Shrader-Frechette has defended the norms of good scientific reasoning in her watchdog focus on the nuclear-power industry.

Philosophy classes, on the whole, ignore the real world problems taken up in Intro to Social Problems classes. There are reasons for that I suspect, even apart from the love of arcane logical symbols and the beautiful ephemera of a PhD on Socrates’ shoe size.

Thus even when we have the chance to make a difference, philosophers often blow it. How many of us, when we teach ethics, have used the hypothetical example of whether torture is justified to get evidence in the face of a ticking bomb? But when a U.S. president actually endorsed the use of torture, there was mostly silence from the philosophical community, from both sides of the political spectrum. Few op-eds in national newspapers. Little attempt to make use of our terrific critical-reasoning skills in the public arena to cut through the fallacies of the politicians or the blowhards on cable TV. Too many preferred instead to brag of their brave political convictions to the captive audience in their classrooms.

Here might be one strong reason that “real world” subjects don’t turn up in phil classrooms. Department heads and uni presidents are often at the mercy of Boards and strongly opinionated (and sometimes equally knowledge-challenged) mega-donors.  So imagine for a moment that someone said something that could be taken as pro-atheist and it turns out there is a loud-mouthed Catholic League benefactor on the Uni Board. Guess what might happen to the lowly (probably) untenured philosopher?

Uhuh.

The real world has costs for the brave of heart. Remember Socrates? His shoe size is safer.

Still, to play safe does mean death for the whole field.

A question: do you know where the saying between a rock and a hard place came from? If you don’t, it might be because other whole fields of knowledge have been booted from the halls of academe before you got to that particular set of lectures.

OK. So what? Who cares about Scylla and Charybdis anyway?

But, just for laughs, imagine that Boehner had to take a critical thinking exam prior to being granted the honour of serving as House Speaker.  Imagine he had to – with the CNN cameras rolling – critically assess his decision to cut their camera feed when the Democrats asked for an accounting of his behaviour in walking out on the opposing point of view? What logic could he use to defend such a ploy in a democracy?

What if this was an example used in a philosophy class – to teach about ethics and logic – to define terms like “democracy” and “fascism”.  I mean really, given such behaviour, which side would the class plump Boehner down on? And if the lecturer drove it home with the question – then those who tolerate such behaviour, or vote such a person into office, what does it say about their values – about what they really think about democracy?

What if the word “theory” and its various uses by scientists and anti-evolutionists was used as an example of linguistic malleability, rhetoric and political/religious logic?

What if the faith-based religions and their various doctrines were examined critically in a classroom? What if there were lessons and mock trials used to show what would happen if such doctrines were attempted literally? Your best friend’s mother discovers Wicca and declares herself a witch. Your doctrine says that witches should die, but it also says that you should not kill. What do you do? It would make a kick-ass class for a critical thinking course, or for one on ethics, or in a religious studies classroom, or…

Can you imagine the uproar? You’d for sure be accused of promoting the “belief system” of secularism. But OK, you could then dissect the term “belief system” to show the emotional rhetoric behind your opponents outraged screams.

Go read about Jane Elliott‘s Blue/Brown Eyed experiment for an example of what happens when you try to teach about how we really see the world, and how we really live, then go out and practice.  See how many death-threats you can garner. She’s still getting them at age 73.

Part 1 of Jane’s video.

Part 2

Thanks Qunqun!

December 21st, 2011

a fish swimming, part 2

The idea that we have become fish out of water, that we are somehow outside life, outside “the world” is Giegerich’s way of explaining why we can suddenly (since the 19th century) ask questions like “is life meaningful”.

Man had to have stepped out of his previous absolute containment in life, so that he now was both enabled and forced to view life as if from outside, because only in this way could the whole of life become thematic in the first place. Now, with the question about its meaning and worth, existence as such had become a vis-à-vis, as it were, which is the opposite of in-ness. Man now for the first time had a position to the world per se. The question of meaning is the mark of the modern period after the conclusion of the age of metaphysics at the beginning of the 19th century. (page 3)

My question is whether or not this is the best way (most accurate with respect to actual human history) to explain the apparent changes in human psychology. For one thing, such a metaphor – to view life from outside – implies a place that is outside our lives. Where would that be? To require a place outside the forces that generate our living for our consciousness to view those same forces necessarily divorces consciousness from its ground of origin. Not only is it probably not empirically possible for such a divorce to occur, but such a view generates a dualistic metaphor that can’t be undone later.

I also have to question the in-ness he assumes in “pre-modern” minds.  He’s talking about the minds that so questioned what they had as to paint the cave walls in France, those same pre-modern minds that came up with the wheel, atl-atls, hide boats, figured out how to domesticate dogs, horses, barley, corn, and everything else that made modern minds what they are. I’m sorry, but those minds sure seem as if they could think outside the in-ness for long stretches at a time.

I think part of the problem is that thinkers about myth and the unconscious seem to take for granted that we have a mind. A mind. We don’t you know. We have many minds and a kind of floating flash-light of an awareness that only makes it seem like we have “a” mind.

As we evolved different abilities, we also developed different brain-body bits to control those developing skills. When the “control movements and coordinate with visual sensations” is needed the spot-light is there and not on the “continually assess smells but only make “us” aware of ones that indicate possible dangers or potential treasures” skill that we still possess (ever suddenly smelt a hint of acrid smoke when you were driving and notice how your attention shoots over there?).  Each of those abilities is the hub of a “mind”; they run simultaneously; most of them are unaware and constitute the manifold territory we know as the unconscious.

If we view mind like a cell, with many interlocking bits that make the thing function as a whole, with no in-ness in any time of human (Homo sapiens) history, then what to make of the loss of meaning?

part 1 here

I’m not done yet so there will be a part 3.

Cathy sent me a copy of Giegerich’s paper “End of Meaning” which I hadn’t read, nor even heard of. (Thanks Cathy!) It’s long and I’m still on the road so I’m reading it a few pages at a time when I stop and have a walk-break.

Here’s the abstract:

“Meaning” as in “the meaning of life” is not (“semantically”) a belief system, but (“syntactically”) the sense of “in-ness.” A comparison of the logic of animal existence with that of human existence reveals that man, despite having been biologically born, remained psychologically unborn, language, myth, metaphysics having served as a secondary psychological “uterus” for him. With the dramatic changes in the human situation since around 1800 (the closure of Western metaphysics, the industrial revolution), the previous in-ness was no more. This fundamental change can be seen as the eventual birth of man, astrologically expressed as the emergence of consciousness from the status of “fish in the water” to that of “Aquarius,” the lord of the waters. In this sense, the “loss” of meaning must not be interpreted negatively as a loss.

C. G. Jung’s personal need to nevertheless regain a new sense of meaning necessitated his becoming a psychologist. Only through the logical interiorization of former contents of myth and metaphysics, only through the displacement of the arena of essential questions from the public world to the so-called unconscious “inside” the private individual, was it possible to simulate a situation where the former sense of meaning could become true once more. This interiorization is comparable to Kronos’ swallowing of his just-born children.

This idea that man has lost the exterior meaning function, that is, we have lost the capacity to live inside myth because we have become individuals, seems a little sideways to me. Nevertheless there are some brilliant moments in just the small amount I have read so far. For example, the idea that meaning is not semantic is frakking brilliant. Of course it can’t be because otherwise any non-linguistic human being is incapable of meaningful moments, relationships etc, and what little is known of normal adults with no language shows that this is not the case. So meaning is pre-linguistic.

What gets me is that Giegerich then goes on to say as his “therefore”

Meaning, where it indeed exists, is first of all an implicit fact of existence, its a priori.

and this is a problem because it shoots us right back into Kant’s lap and that simply will not do. Now, perhaps that’s not what he intended so I’ll keep reading and see what happens.

So here’s what I am going to do. I’m going to do one of those post-as-you-read/react things.

The next installment will be titled: a fish swimming, part 2

November 5th, 2011

Timothy Morton’s poetics

I’ve been struggling with Timothy Morton‘s Ecology Without Nature, and for now am finished with it.

Essentially, what the book does is deconstruct Romantic ecocriticsm with the idea of making it stronger, and moving our attention back to the seams in our reality and thus breaking down what Romanticism (and contemporary ecocriticism) tries to construct as a seamless whole.

In aid of this he develops his deconstructive criticisms of ecomimesis, which is a way of describing nature (through art) as if we could see nature truly, and undesigned, unconfigured by our own agendas. And of course we do see the world through our own bodily agendas. Morton is absolutely correct in this. The thing I have a problem with is Morton’s solution to this identity politics/identity aesthetics, which is to construct our “art” in such a way (collages, mash ups, montages, etc) so as to keep the seems—the agendas—always visible.

To describe my reservations with his “ecocritical artwork” I am going to resort to geometry and Abbott’s Flatland. Imagine Mr. Square inside a Circle home. He has been reading too much Wordsworth and so he continues to try and apprehend Sphere by repeatedly transiting the circumference of the Circle home.

Circumference of a Circle = π • diameter

N0w imagine Mr Square reads Dr Morton and has a revelation about the failure of the subject. As a consequence he gives up his attempt to encompass the circle’s circumference. Instead he realizes the power of radians, radii and chords. In this way Mr Square gives up the idea of grasping the concept of sphere through grasping the whole of a circle and instead seeks to understand through the jagged juxtopositions of wandering roads along a variety of meeting and unmeeting lines intersecting with the aforesaid circumference and creating angles as yet unseen by Mr Square.

The thing is, of course, that Mr Square’s broken linear progressions will not get him any closer to sphere than would his circumferential perambulations. Both styles of walking are of the Area of a Circle; they are a dialog between two algorithmic terms.

Sphere Volume = 4/3 • π • r³

To get to where Morton wants to go—the sphere in my little metaphor—the problem cannot be constructed as a dialectic. It requires three terms to figure the volume of a sphere. And his collisions, collations, constructions, will not allow for it.

Should you want to read a good review of Morton’s book which summarizes his position on ecomimesis rather well go read “Ecocriticism, Ecomimesis, and the Romantic Roots of Modern Ethical Consumption” by Vince Carducci in Literature Compass 6/3 (2009): 632–646, 10.1111/j.1741-4113.2009.00638.x. I got a copy of it through a restricted service I have access to so I cannot give you a link.