September 24th, 2011

morning funny

How much you want to bet this guy is tall?

via Wimp

August 15th, 2011

oddities that reveal

Those numbers of last post have receded a little, but there’s another little oddity that surfaced in the quieter clamor of post-nap Mary’s head.

The word “stigma” means “mark”: there’s its sense as a mark of shame, or culturally/socially standing alone, but really the word is about being marked generally. So that makes stigmata (used in the Christian sense), a mark of Jesus. And in Greek, it (stigma) can also mean a tattoo, another kind of mark. But “stigma” is also a letter (Greek Digamma cursive 04.svg, a mark on some matrix like papyrus or stone) that combines the Greek letters Sigma and Tau.

Don’t you think it culturally revealing that all these things can be carried by the same word?

June 16th, 2011

lack of focus can be good

At least that’s what I want to be true. Can’t focus today (and it is not the Canucks fault). I got up this morning about 7 and started picking up things and reading a paragraph, then going online and wandering around looking at things and letting a stray word or idea move me around.

The tour has led me to some interesting things. I was reading the introductory paragraphs over at Arts & Letters Daily and decided to click on “more” under “Errol Morris” (of whom I had never heard, although I did know The Thin Blue Line) and that led me to the original site of the article, which lead me to Morris’ site, which exploded into…

Saul Kripke and the question of how language attaches us to the world, which led to thinking about how the Kripke argument relates to the literary theories of modernism and post-modernism. Which led back to Rilke and his Malte and the question of who was the real poet and whether a thing-in-itself can be said to exist, and the silliness of some questions.

Bertrand Russel and the fun that is his “existentialist’s nightmare” and the threat that taking what you think too seriously which led to some daydreaming about ravens that speak French (Enfin, tu souffres. Enfin, tu existes.), which led to a mild curiosity about what Whorf or Nagel would have made of such a corvid.

Thinking about whether our various senses don’t act a bit like Duchamp’s Nude Descending Staircase. That is, we perceive an enormous amount of material but we only “need” a small fraction of what is perceptible. (The need is based on the current situation and in fact if we did consciously perceive all that our bodies “know” in any given moment we’d go screamingly nuts is very short order and actually walking down a staircase would probably be fatal.) That data which is identified as immediately necessary is tagged and the total of the tagged perceptions are amassed into a coherent moment, which rather than looking like Duchamp’s picture comes to appear to us more like this. In other words, we percieve→react/assess→edit→project/compile→”see”. It is only at the “see” that we become aware and so it is what becomes real.

(another stray curiosity – Duchamp’s painting is an explosion of the eye perceiving and consolidating. I wonder what an equivalent “explosion” would be like for the nose smelling lilac in the enormous welter of alternate spring smells – or the ear hearing a chickadee with traffic in the distance, or the skin when tickled in moving air.)

But back to the original prompt – does that mean we don’t perceive what is “there”? Or that we can’t understand the mind of someone born in another time and place? It seems to me the problem is in the question. They can’t be answered truthfully and more than “have you stopped beating your wife” can – if you’re a person who has never beaten your wife.

Anyway, I’ve spent all morning wandering. I think I’ll take a nap then read a novel. Need to save my energy, going to a poetry reading tonight.

Oh, and I really like Morris’ way of writing.

taken by peardg

I love locust trees. The photo wasn’t taken by me and the tree itself is no where near me so I can’t check for the thorns, but I  think this is a black locust.

I love locust trees, in part because of the leaf shape, but mostly because of the way the thorns and the name fit together in my head. I’m not a cuddly-bunny kind of person, you know, I prefer badgers. And ravens to robins. So the same goes for trees. I like thorns. Of course the honey locust beats the black locust as far as thorns go, but still what a name – “black locust” – I mean how goth can you get?

Of course the word “locust” comes from the Latin word locusta that signifies both the insect we know as the locust and the lobster. That’s kind of cool. The visual parallel of the hard shell of the lobster and the insect was what must have been significant. The tree got the name because someone thought the seed pod looked like the insect—named though visual metaphor. I find that fascinating; it says something about folk classificatory systems don’t you think?

I think there is another layer though. The biblical place of the locust and the idea of a plague, and the hardship of the locust being your main food source. Both seem very thorny, with respect to the possibility of human comfort. And yet the leaves of the locust are wonderfully graceful and somehow soft and sensuous. The individual blades of the compound leaves even look like the straight wings of the insect. They are both fully strong and fully graceful. For me its the combination of the thorn and the grace that makes the parallel between the insect and the tree both meaningful and apropos.

June 2nd, 2011

words

Do you ever think about what words are?

They must be constructs, based ultimately on meaning structured by our bodies, but what does that really say?

Seamus Heaney seems to have believed (don’t know if he still does) that words are somehow objects, or arise from objects in the world. Words are things that can fly, shelter, stream.

The Loaning (from Station Island)

As I went down the loaning
the wind shifting in the hedge was like
an old one's whistling speech. And I knew
I was in the limbo of lost words.

They had flown there from raftered sheds and crossroads,
from the shelter of gabled ends and turned-up carts.
I saw them streaming out of birch white throats
and fluttering above iron bedsteads
until the soul would leave the body.
Then on a day as close as a stranger's breath
they rose in smoky clouds on the summer sky
and settled on the uvulae of stones
and the soft lungs of the hawthorne.
Then I knew why from the beginning
the loaning breathed on me, breathed even now
in a shiver of beaded gossamers
and the spit blood of a last few haws and rose-hips.

There’s more to this poem, but you get the idea of what words mean to Heaney. In some way words seem to be the soul. They inhabit the “uvulae of stones and the soft lungs of the hawthorne.” Words are a connecting force somehow linking man to land.

So very beautiful, yet I find it really disturbing.  There is a sense that the words are independent of the speaker, that the world grows the words as it grows the haw and rose-hip. If this is true then there is no distance between the thing in itself and the word that signals it. So either things are symbols or words are things; I’m not sure which is worse.

Yet there is the medial image. The loaning (space between cultivated fields) strikes me as the place one occupies when one is bi-cultural in some profound way. It is a kind of limbo because one can never really be at home, not in a consuming way, not to find that place of rest which is assumed in any ultimate destination.

And there are lost words. For Heaney those words like “loaning” and for me words in Salish which I will never know, and never be able to adequately pronounce.  But it isn’t really the word itself for me, and I suspect it is for Heaney. He seems to locate the power of the earth in the word itself, and in this he seems really to see words as objects whereas I see them as constructs.

In Heaney’s world a word lost is like an extinction – the death of some lineage of butterfly. Using the words is an act of rebellion against death. And like some mythological spiritual traveller, from his place between cultures Heaney the poet can access the dark grey of limbo and lure back into the air lost souls, lost words.

There sure is literary precedent for such a view. But I can’t go there, because words are not really things despite their apparent power. The idea of words as things is endemic because in our embodied existence we know power through things. We hit our brother with our teddy bear and “bam” a reaction. That’s power. Later we call brother some nasty, nasty word and “bam” a reaction. Words are power; so words are things: lived logic.

I think of words like the blue in a blueberry. Put a blueberry in a fire. Where’d the blue go? Words are the “blue” in a blueberry. Not the thing itself; not existent independent of the thing; not something that can flutter up on Limbo’s winds. Words are moments of our embodied relationship to things in the world. They are the humming unconscious network of our senses, energy vibrating in ways sensible to our bodies, the awareness of difference, the desire to categorize. Words are the first green shoot to pierce the earth’s skin in an unthought drive for sky.

Even more I think of words as distilled human movement, a gestural structuring of a learned physical concept. They must be really, since as a species we first had movement, then learning and communication, then oral or gestural language, then writing – specifically words. These abilities aren’t independent species’ acquisitions. They are built one on top of the other using the structures and limitations of the preceding stage to form the foundation of the next. In other words, our capacities to learn and communicate were built on the structures and functions of human movement and physical capability.

It’s that evolutionary basis in movement that makes me say words are not things but distilled human doings. So when we lose a word, like some now lost Salish concepts, we have lost a history of someone living, some person doing in his or her world, what his or her people did. There is no limbo for that. That death is just death. Resurrection can only come if some other person, some future group relearns and re-does what the lost once knew. And that? I don’t know if that is really possible.

Ursula K Le Guin has a blog which I discovered not long ago. In it is a wonderful piece about the colour beige. Yes. Beige. Here’s a bit of it.

So what did I want to say about the color? Was I just being defensive about my skin and my clothes? There was something more than that. A positive feeling. A defense of beige itself. A real liking for that range of color – the bigios, the gentle, subtle, lively earth colors. The color of unbleached, undyed wool. The dun of a dun horse. The color (aside from the black and white and pink etc. of their markings and decorations) of the feathers of sparrows and towhees and finches and quail and robins and phoebes …. a sort of default feather color. The tan or dun or light brown of many lovely, common kinds of wood. The color of many rocks — sandstones, volcanic ash, beach sand. The color of very old paper. The soft color of dust.

She also has a really lovely piece called The Horsies Upstairs. It’s about belief, learning and truth. A bit:

Specifically human knowledge is imparted largely through language, so first we have to learn language, then listen to what we’re told, and believe it. Testing the validity of information should always be permitted and is sometimes necessary but may also be dangerous: the little one had better believe without running any tests that the stove burner could burn even when it isn’t red, that if you eat Gramma’s medicine you will be sick, that running out into the street is not a good idea… Anyhow there’s so much to be learned, it can’t all be tested. We really do have to believe what our elders tell us. We can perceive for ourselves, but have very little instinctive knowledge in how to act on our perceptions, and must be shown the basic patterns of how to arrange the world and how to find our way through it.

Therefore the incalculable value of true information, and the unforgivable wrongness of lying to a child. An adult has the option of not believing. A child, particularly your own child, doesn’t.

What she’s said is going click-click-click with Gilbert’s stuff on false belief. Click, click, click, click.

Maybe the light will turn on if I feed the current with a little caffeine?

“Goats to be gardeners” is a phrase that comes from James Lovelock. The full thing:

Our religions have not yet given us the rules and guidance for our relationship with Gaia. The humanist concept of sustainable development and the Christian concept of stewardship are flawed by unconscious hubris. We have neither the knowledge nor the capacity to achieve them. We are no more qualified to be the stewards or developers of the Earth than are goats to be gardeners.

Taylor quotes the passage in an early section called “living examples of dark green religion.” I love the phrase “goats to be gardeners”. It so simply portrays a situation where our natural inclination, our very talents and physicality, makes it all but impossible for us to do certain things. Goats have the talent of surviving nearly anywhere and they do that by getting every ounce of flora that is to be had in an area. Of course that means they denude a landscape. Very much like us. I’ve always thought the Jesus metaphor should have portrayed him as the shepherd who walked along behind his goats. It would have been so much more metaphorically accurate.

Anyway, whatever you belief about the existence of Gaia, Lovelock’s analogy is apt. We are very goat-like with respect to our talents for environmental transformation. Now you may say that we are much more aware than goats—the existence of National Parks is evidence that we can control ourselves.

I’d say that is both true and trivial.

The areas where we cannot control ourselves seem to me to be far more ultimately destructive and one of those is our need to reason from what it is like to be human to what it must be like to be non-human. It’s a bit like the is→ought fallacy: I feel I have a “self” therefore there must be a “self” as part of any complex, or living, organism. Bullshit, of course.

What I’m talking about here is the process of embodied cognition and its rational consequences. The fact that reasoning for human beings is something we cannot help but do, just as goats cannot stop before they uproot the plant and destroy its ability to return, makes the process of reasoning something critical to understand if we are to figure out when it misleads us and when it doesn’t.

We are such spectacular successes as technological animals that it seems impossible to argue that our brand of reasoning doesn’t work. We were, after all, evolved inside the environment in which our embodied reasoning takes place, so of course it fits. When we reason about distance and the control of objects based on our bodily experience of extending our arms and legs and picking up things from the ground, such extensions work so well they are essentially invisible. It just seems obvious, all of a piece, natural. We don’t think about it at all. To reach for things, is to grasp them, to understand. It seems so very clear that this is the way to handle the world. It works. We reach out with our minds and grasp a situation. We must, therefore, have it in hand. It’s such a horrible surprise to find that what we thought we had grasped, what we are so very sure we had understood, turns out to vanish while we watch. A phantasm.

And how we experience things is vitally important and horrifically strong. We have built-in images of which we are profoundly sure. It is most disconcerting to have these disconfirmed. Like an apotemnophiliac or a somatoparaphreniac we can sometimes refuse the evidence of our eyes and hands and insist that the evidence of error is not there, or insist that it be removed at once so that our inner sense of what is true remains unchallenged.

Some bits of our embodied reasoning are less sure than our assumptions about understanding and directly grasping the world or the ones that work like body image and body integrity. Like why is “up” associated with “good,” why “black” with “evil”, these kinds of metaphorical reasoning have long bothered. Religious and moral reasoning is of this sort. Still, like the concept of “grasping” as “understanding”, moral thinking is also a metaphorical extension of our bodily experience. We are deeply (largely, but not completely, unconsciously) aware of the dangers of being “down” and “in the dark.” Another example: that there must be a being to which we turn is a natural extension for a species that is fundamentally dependent on other existent, and more powerful, members of the same species to enable individual existence. Nothing in our evolution or our individual development leads us to bodily experience radical individualism. We are all dependent on the existence of others.

We can do nothing about this capacity to think through bodily metaphor except pay attention to our doing of it. We think through our body’s experience of life. Yet by paying attention to a limitation we can become conscious of doing it and try to circumvent the worst of its effects. I doubt we’ll ever be able to forgo the feeling that there must be a “self” like ours out there but we can recognize that it is an illusion of the sort that confuses us—as do all those wonderful optical illusions. Like the Müller-Lyer illusion, we are built to work with a specific kind of environment, to enable us to survive its demands. We are not built to perceive accurately; we are built to perceive effectively.

The concept of “self” is something that corresponds to the “error” in our reading the length of the arrows in the Müller-Lyer illusion through our bodily knowledge of depth perception. The “self” provides a perceptual tool akin to reading a 3D world. A “self” is something that is meant to interpret a social situation that has immense importance to human survival. Just as we see those line segments as being of different lengths because normally in a 3D world they would be, so reading the “self” onto others works for us because in the case of human society the other will have an experience of self like our own.The problem is that we don’t stop at other humans. We read everything that way, especially anything that triggers “other” like a feeling of awe, or the appearance of a big head and big eyes. Of course outside human society such a reading is almost certainly not true.

So? Well let me give you an example of how this kind of misapplied thinking can create more problems than it solves. For a long time women were thought to be misproportioned men, missing a vital bit of anatomy. Need I say more?

I think saving the earth is rather important; our lives probably depend upon it. And while it is true that the feelings of awe, reverence, wonder and the like that Taylor construes as Dark Green Religion can be seen as a new religion, is this the most useful way of doing so? Will it accomplish what Taylor wants—the change of our behaviour to reduce our goat-like destructiveness? Probably not if we keep using the same kind of logical patterns that created much of the problem in the first place. The thing is that those nasties seem to be tied up with the inherent bodily logic of the human religious impulse, tied as it is to seeing echoes of ourselves in the world around us. What I think we need to do is see that this is an illusion, and not despise it, but just recognize that it is not a true representation of the non-human other.

If we can do that, then maybe we can get down to the business of finding a more accurate metaphor for what is in fact the case in all things non-human, i.e. that they are not human. That they are something quite else.

March 10th, 2011

what is “evidence”

I’ve been thinking about what the word “evidence” means. This relates to my current reading of Dawkins’ book and to a comment by QunQun talking about Wittgenstein and the idea of language games.

Evidence as a term means that which tends to prove or disprove something, or it can be grounds for the belief of something. What a definition like this does is make anything potentially “evidence” for any proposition you care to make. I could say, for example, that the Wingabonga lives in the winter jasmine in my garden and cite as evidence for that belief my dream about the Wingabonga, and the fact that I found the Wingabonga’s favourite food near the plant. This counts as evidence because the dream and my finding orange peel on the pavement in my yard are the grounds upon which my belief in the Wingabonga’s residence took hold. They are also evidence for the existence of the Wingabonga. Does this really count as “evidence”? Sure, why not? It meets the limits of the definition.

Looking at the term “proof” doesn’t help because all it means is “evidence sufficient to establish a thing as true”. Ambivalence: that’s the nature of words.

What Wittgenstein showed with his language games concept is that what the word “evidence” actually means is how it is used within a specific language community. So Dawkins, being a scientist, has an idea of what evidence means that is established by how “evidence” is used in the science language community. This involves, amongst other things, checking to see if Wingabongas actually exist in the empirical world. This fact checking with respect to the empirical world acts as a guide to whether a Wingabonga can possibly live under my winter jasmine. My dreams and my orange peel evidence are secondary to the empirical fact of the Wingabonga’s non-existence. This empirical fact (the Wingabonga’s non-existence) negates the evidence of my dreams and the orange peel detritus. It doesn’t say I didn’t have the dream and that I didn’t find the orange peel, just that the dream and the placement of the orange peel mean something other than what I thought.

This is the kind of empirical evidence Dawkins wants for god. And of course there isn’t any.

So what counts as evidence for a theist? There are a good many, but most of them have to do with the human community. There are things like the fact that all human cultures worship some form of divine, for example. Why isn’t this good enough for Dawkins? Because it is like my orange peel evidence. Sure the orange peel is there. Does that mean a Wingabonga lives in my winter jasmine? No. There will be another explanation, although I may not be privy to it.

Then there are the arguments for god that try to base themselves on empirical evidence. I think these kinds of arguments have arisen (like creationism) because science and its idea of evidence is clearly successful and powerful. Science and empirical evidence has become the one to beat. The problem with that is that the natural “territory” of religious language includes the word “evidence” but it isn’t the kind based on empirical data. That word has rules, and one is to test the hypothesis for empirical validity, and, because of that, the god test keeps failing.

What appears to me, though, is that those who keep bashing up against the empirical wall don’t seem to realize that there is a fundamental difference between what they took as “evidence” for the existence of god (their church, their feelings, their family belief, their assessment of odd events as they relate to their story of origin) is not the same thing as the “evidence” that supports things like evolution. So they keep doing silly things like the banana proof without any apparent clue to how foolish they appear.

So which “evidence” is right? Neither of course. However, if you use the theistic form of the term in the scientific language community you’re going to get intellectually smashed. Expecting otherwise is not a mark of intelligence.

January 6th, 2011

dead birds and word power

You have heard of the dead blackbirds I am sure. Here is the most useful coverage of it I have seen.

Are birds falling from the sky examples of pareidolia, eschatology, or something else?

Essentially the blackbirds died because fireworks frightened them out of their wits. But never mind the facts, this is a “sure sign” that Harold Camping is right. Ugh.

There is a difference between what we experience and what we think it means.

November 2nd, 2010

Words, their power and beauty

Listen to this hour long podcast about the power and beauty of words. It’s stunning. I’m going to have to think about it for a while.

Thanks to mango for suggesting it.